Conservative critics of the President's Afghanistan speech have generally applauded his decision to deploy more troops while writing scathingly about his timeline for withdrawing American troops. One argument is that by announcing an 18 month limit for the surge, he will encourage our enemies to lie low for that time and come out when we are gone. I hope that that is true. It will give us a year and a half to accomplish our objectives with little resistance.
The more serious argument is that the time limit indicates a lack of commitment on the President's part. Ralph Peters put it best:
It's as if, during WWII, we'd told the Japanese and Germans that we really meant business, but intended to quit by 1944.
The depth of the President's commitment is the real question. The Washington Post has a fine piece on the process from which the President's policy emerged. From this piece, by Anne E. Kornblut, Scott Wilson and Karen DeYoung, we learn just how the President took all those months to reach a conclusion. The WaPo piece tries to make the President look heroic, but does not quite succeed.
Last summer it looked like the President was at odds with his generals. General McChrystal was saying in public that a big increase in troops was necessary, which was apparently not what the President had in mind. The press reported this as a case of generals getting too big for their britches and forgetting who was in charge. The WaPo piece explains what really happened.
In June, [General] McChrystal noted, he had arrived in Afghanistan and set about fulfilling his assignment. His lean face, hovering on the screen at the end of the table, was replaced by a mission statement on a slide: "Defeat the Taliban. Secure the Population."
"Is that really what you think your mission is?" one of those in the Situation Room asked.
On the face of it, it was impossible -- the Taliban were part of the fabric of the Pashtun belt of southern Afghanistan, culturally if not ideologically supported by a significant part of the population. "We don't need to do that," Gates said, according to a participant. "That's an open-ended, forever commitment."
But that was precisely his mission, McChrystal responded, and it was enshrined in the Strategic Implementation Plan -- the execution orders for the March strategy, written by [Obama's own] NSC staff.
In short, the Obama Administration didn't know what its own Afghanistan strategy was. General McCrystal did know. He was only doing and saying what the President had instructed him to do and say, even if the President had no idea what that was.
The WaPo story explains in great detail how the present policy was developed. But it contains another tidbit that is rather worrisome. Here is how the final "decision" was made:
Just after twilight on Nov. 29, Obama gathered Biden, Gates, Petraeus, Jones, Emanuel, Cartwright and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Oval Office. He had called Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton earlier.
He had made his decision.
Thirty thousand additional U.S. troops would arrive in Afghanistan by summer, and NATO would be asked to send at least 5,000 forces. …
Obama then went around the room asking one question: Do you support the strategy?
"If they didn't support the decision, he was going to issue another decision" until there was unanimity, a senior administration official said. "But it was his assessment that everyone could and should get behind it." Each of them did.
Now look at those words carefully. He had made his decision. Except that he hadn't. If "they" didn't agree, he was going to make another decision. He got unanimous agreement. Did it have to be unanimous? What if Secretary Clinton had expressed reservations on the phone?
The President is supposed to make such decisions. That is his job. President Obama prefers to outsource his most important decisions to other people. This is a bad sign. Suppose the President confronts a real national security crisis, one in which his advisers are divided. What will the Hyde Park Hamlet do?
For now, the commander of insurgent forces in Afghanistan, if there is one, need only worry about which of the President's decision makers he has to turn when the moment of truth comes.
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