My colleague Prof. Blanchard records some thoughts on the now ridiculous attempt by states to move their presidential primaries to the front of the parade. Why not get it over with and have all primaries the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday in November four years before the presidential election in question. We can then literally have constant campaigning for president. In my previous post I mentioned James Ceaser. Ceaser's first book was Presidential Selection. Granted, it is now almost 30 years old, but it still speaks to our present conundrum (in fact, Ceaser predicted it). As we think about candidate selection, Ceaser asks us to consider what we want out of an electoral mechanism in addition to recording the preferences of the people. The recording of preferences is the easy part; even the Iraqis can do that. But as Iraq shows us, just holding elections is not enough to constitute a sound democracy. Ceaser suggests four additional criteria for an electoral mechanism:
1. Minimize the harmful effects of ambition. In short, this means avoid demagoguery. Demagogues make promises they cannot keep, playing to the people's greed and short-term interests, and also play on the people's fears, appealing to our worst instincts rather than our best.
2. Promote proper leadership. The art of governing is the art of compromise. A system that promotes good compromisers over combativeness is a better system. We also have to recognize that getting votes and governing are two
different talents. Just because someone is good at getting public
attention (like a rock star) doesn't mean he or she will be an effective governor.
3. Secure able leaders. Obviously we want people competent to do the job to which they have been elected.
4. Enable legitimate accession to power, i.e., the people must see the system as basically legitimate. Those who end up winning are the people who actually won.
We should ask whether the current system works to these ends. I would argue that it does not, especially as regards to points #1 and #2. For one thing, the frontloading of primaries causes a "permanent campaign." I have posted on the permanent campaign before. Here are Joseph Pika and John Anthony Maltese on the problem posed by the permanent campaign:
The problem with such tactics is that campaigning--by its very nature--is adversarial, while governing is--or at lest should be--largely collaborative. As [Hugh] Heclo puts it, "campaigning is self-centered, and governing is group-centered." When the permanent campaign becomes the predominant governing style, however, collaboration becomes difficult. Not surprisingly, recent years have seen a breakdown of the elite bargaining community that used to collaborate to produce policy.
I am less concerned about the "breakdown of the elite bargaining community" (although it something to be concerned about) than I am about the kind of appeals candidates make to the electorate and how they shape the electorate's opinions. In a post a few weeks ago, Prof. Blanchard eloquently wrote, "Eloquent language not only communicates and persuades, it fashions new architecture in the souls of those who appreciate it." What architecture is being formed by the demagogic rhetoric of the permanent campaign?
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