Last post by me on this topic. Honest. Ken Blanchard responds to my response to his post on "dangerous questions" posed by science. Ken and I agree that some of Steven Pinker's original "dangerous questions generated by science" are not very strong questions. Ken argues that I am too limited in my view of what science can answer. Ken takes as his jumping off point my analysis of how one would go about figuring out whether religion or Nazism killed more people (one of Pinker's questions). I questioned how one would know what people's motivations are for killing others, using the example of Elizabeth I killing her sister Mary. Ken responds:
Just because a question is hard to answer, or requires a lot of work to define, doesn't mean it can't be answered by science or at least by a scientifically rigorous historical examination. Would Mary have represented a threat to Elizabeth or vice versa if not for the religious difference? I see no reason by argument and evidence cannot be employed against the question.
I think the error Ken makes is to say that every argument from evidence and reason is therefore a scientific argument. I disagree. One of the foundations of the scientific method is that scientific investigation must begin with a hypothesis that is falsifiable. For example, if I argue that in a vacuum a ton of lead falls faster than a ton of feathers, that hypothesis can be proven false by experimentation.
If, however, I argue that if Stonewall Jackson had not died at Chancellorsville the Confederates would have defeated the Federals at Gettysburg, this is not a falsifiable hypothesis, thus is not a scientific question. We cannot go back in time, resurrect Jackson, send him to Gettysburg and see what happens. This does not mean we cannot gather evidence, reason through the evidence, and come to a conclusion. This is historical reasoning, not scientific reasoning, strictly speaking. The problem with many (most?) historical and political questions is that the "data" that is gathered to answer the question is often uncertain. Take my Elizabeth I example. How would we prove that she killed Mary for religious reasons? The evidence will be murky. We will have to depend on the recollections of observers, which are often inaccurate and/or contradictory. Even if we have a diary from Elizabeth stating, "I killed Mary because I hate Catholics," can we trust her? Ken, being a good Straussian, knows that people sometimes cover up the truth because saying the truth might be dangerous. As one of our colleagues notes, in History, as in Political Science, some argue that "the only History that counts is the History that counts," meaning History working off of statistical data. This is an attempt to make History a scientific discipline in the same manner as, say, physics. And I say the study of history is not a scientific enterprise, which is not to say it can learn nothing from science or its method.
Which brings me to my final point, whether it is always good to know and to tell the truth. Again, Ken knows there are such things as noble lies. Every regime has them. And let's consider Aristotle on friendship. Friends are those who hold things in common. The kind of friendship one has with another depends on what the friends hold in common (is it self-interest, or love of virtue). Aristotle uses the discussion of friendship as a jumping off point for his discussion of politics. Regimes, it seems, are a society of friends (of some sort) who hold something in common. That "thing held in common" is a particular way of life. Certain questions are simply regarded as settled. For example, do we really want to fight, generation after generation, over whether men are really created equal? As individuals in certain circumstances we may want to hold that notion up to consideration, but as a society it is best to leave our consensus as it is. Tocqueville argues that every regime, as every individual, has and must have its dogmas. I am not worried about any particular item on Mr. Pinker's list outside of seriously considering whether killing babies is a good idea if it makes the rest of us feel better and we deem it is "for their own good." But I do caution against asking dangerous questions simply for the sake of asking dangerous questions. No doubt being "dangerous" makes us feel important, and who doesn't like to feel important, but as I said in my previous post, this is the mark of the adolescent not the responsible scientist.
This is my last word on the topic.
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