Professor Schaff invites me to post again on the use of Diebold touch screen voting machines. Short of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, this might be the most alarming story of the day. The 2000 election debacle in Florida triggered a wave of election reform bills in many states. There is no doubt that the butterfly ballet used in many Florida counties was a bad piece of work. It required voters to physically poke out a small paper rectangle (the infamous chad). Chads piled up, resulting in a lot of ballots that recorded no vote. In addition, the booklet style ballot had to be properly aligned, or you could end up voting for people you never intended to vote for. How else did Pat Buchanan carry a largely Jewish county?
But reformers in many states decided that we needed a brand new voting technology, and moved to adopt touch screen computer voting machines. According to the manufacturer Diebold
Over 130,000 Diebold electronic voting stations
are being used in locations across the United States to assist voters
in exercising their most fundamental constitutional right: the right to
vote.
This is a classic case of bright idea reform: replacing a bad system with one that is absolutely horrific. I don't often agree with Lou Dobbs, but he hits this nail right on the head.
Across the nation, eight out of every 10 voters will be casting
their ballots this November on electronic voting machines. And these
machines time and again have been demonstrated to be extremely
vulnerable to tampering and error, and many of them have no
voter-verified paper trail.
There is simply no way in which
election officials and their staffs of thousands of volunteers with
limited experience and often poor training can possibly carry out
reliable recounts.
In fact, it's much worse than that. The Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy has issued a study of the Diebold machines. Here is the abstract:
This paper presents a fully independent
security study of a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its
hardware and software. We obtained the machine from a private party.
Analysis of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows
that it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For example, an
attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable memory
card for as little as one minute could install malicious code;
malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying
all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent
vote count it creates. An attacker could also create malicious code
that spreads automatically and silently from machine to machine during
normal election activities — a voting-machine virus. We have
constructed working demonstrations of these attacks in our
lab. Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting
machine's hardware and software and the adoption of more rigorous
election procedures.
In another investigation, it was revealed that the diebold machine could be opened with the key to a hotel room liquor cabinet.
The most terrifying feature of this system is that it produces no paper record. If the voting record from one or more machines was suspect, there would be no way to go back and find out how people actually voted. That information would be lost forever. In any close election, and maybe in any election at all, there will be no reason for public confidence in election results. This is a recipe for a disaster that will make Florida 2000 look like a stubbed toe.
The only good news is that the Diebold system seems to be breaking down where ever it has been tried, faster than the results can be questioned. Again from Dobbs:
The May primary election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, was nothing less
than a complete debacle. A report from the Election Science Institute
found the electronic voting machines' four sources of vote totals --
individual ballots, paper trail summary, election archives and memory
cards -- didn't even match up. The totals were all different, and the
report concluded that relying on the current system for Cuyahoga
County's more than 1.3 million people should be viewed as "a calculated
risk." Are we really willing to risk our democracy?
This problem
is obviously not limited to Ohio. During Illinois' March primary, Cook
County delayed the results of its crucial county board elections for a
week as a result of human and mechanical problems at hundreds of sites
with the new voting machines.
The recent primary elections in
Montgomery County, Maryland, also highlighted just how unprepared many
polling places are for the midterms. The state election administrator
is demanding to know what went wrong after election workers did not
receive access cards to operate the Diebold voting machines for the
county's 238 precincts on time, forcing as many as 12,000 voters to use
provisional paper ballots that ran out quickly. Some were simply told
to come back later and vote.
Diebold executives Dr. Moe, Dr. Larry, and Dr. Curly could not be reached for comment. For there is no excuse for this situation. The flaws in computer-only voting machines have been evident for years.
And in fact, we already have perfectly reliable voting systems. South Dakota uses a paper ballot which voters mark by blackening a circle with a lead pencil. The ballots can then be read by computers. The ballot is difficult to screw up. The orginal vote is recorded on a piece of paper that cannot be subsequently modified by the machine. If there is any doubt about the machine that does the counting, the ballots can easily be examined and recorded by hand. In my view, all elections should use such ballots. Why was it so hard for legislators across the country to recognize this? Perhaps because they cannot resist spending a lot of money on new toys.
Due to a lot of bright idea reformers, we are positioned for the perfect electoral storm this November.
Recent Comments