From the sublime to the ridiculous, I have been meaning to deal with a typically silly post from Clean Cut Kid about judicial activism. The claim is that the real activists are the conservatives on the Supreme Court because they have been more likely to strike down acts of the US Congress. This position is eviscerated here and here. To sum up, although the conservatives on the Court have voted to invalidate many federal laws, this has mostly been part of the return to federalism characteristic of the last fifteen or so years. The liberal activists have been far more likely to strike down state and local laws, which represent a higher proportion of cases before the Court. This is especially true of the controversial areas of religion, abortion, the death penalty, etc. Also, CCK needs a math lesson. Even if Clarence Thomas has held 2/3rds of the federal laws presented before him to be unconstitutional, that doesn't mean the thinks 2/3rds of all acts of Congress are unconstitutional. I am sure CCK is aware that only a small handful of federal laws ever get challenged up the Supreme Court. He must have momentarily forgotten this.
What is "judicial activism" vs. "judicial restraint"? That's a big question which can't be answered in a blog post, but let me try out some thoughts. First, the controversies arise because the Constitution contains some ambiguities. Looking simply at the Bill of Rights, what is an "unreasonable" search? What is "cruel and unusual" punishment? Since we all pretty much agree that "fighting words" or libel and slander are not protected speech, what does "free speech and press" mean? Or as Prof. Blanchard and I argued about recently, what is "public use" as stated in the 5th Amendment? Generally (and thus simplifying), it is fair to say that the believer in judicial restraint thinks that the court is a bad place to go to resolve these ambiguities. First, when deciding the meaning of these phrases, the surest and most consistent way to interpret them is in light of the original intent of those who wrote the words (Rehnquist and Thomas) or in the plain meaning of the words (Scalia). The words can't mean simply anything, so let's try to figure out what they meant to those who wrote them. As society progresses and mores and values change, these words do not change meaning. The Court is thus the wrong institution to advance societal change. Also, the Court works in an adversarial process. They do not pick the controversies, the controversies pick them. Also, there is winner and a loser in a court case, thus making middle ground hard to find. Many of the thorniest questions of our day require compromise, but the Courts are not institutionally designed for compromise. Compromise is the art of the legislator, and when the judge acts as a compromiser he is acting more like a legislator than a judge. Also, as an unelected body, the Court is not necessarily representative of public opinion. This all adds up to the Court justly being restrained in the use of its power of judicial review. If the people want to expand the grant of rights and privileges accorded to citizens, they should do so through the majoritiarian processes of legislation or amendment to the Constitution and not look to the Court as an agent of social change. The Constitution has many devices to protect rights, especially minority rights, and to elevate the Court as the ultimate protector of rights suggests a profound misunderstanding of the constitutional order.
The judicial activist is more likely to see the Constitution as a living document whose meaning changes as mores and values change. If the meaning of the Constitution changes, the judge who interprets the ambiguities of the Constitution must apply the new meanings. After all, the founders were not as enlightened by science and progress as we are, so it is a disservice to the republic to constrain ourselves to the Founders' outmoded views. The judge is thus fulfilling his role as interpreter when he recognizes new rights and privileges that those who wrote the document would not have considered as being worthy of constitutional protection. Also, majorities are often bigoted and self-interested, and so only the unelected Supreme Court has the objectivity needed to solve the most controversial questions. All of this means that the Court should be active in using its power of judicial review since the Court is an agent of progress and justice (indeed it might be the most important agent of progress and justice).
I have simplified, and thus have ignored important nuances in these two positions, but I think this description is accurate enough. Clearly I think that the restraintest position is the most consistent with the intended constitutional order, and I think a cursory reading of the Federalist Papers (especially #'s 9, 10, 47, 48, 51 and 78) bear this out.
I note that the second link above is to the Volokh Conspiracy, a site I highly recommend for very sane readings on legal developments across the nation. I detect a slight libertarian bent to the blog, but the bloggers on the site (all law professors so far as I can tell) are very sober in their opinions.
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